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PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION ON DEATH-RIGHT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE DECEASED P AR'I'NER TO SHARE IN Goon WILL-Plaintiff sought a judg-
ment against the administrator of his deceased partner to compel the conveyance 
of the deceased's one-half interest in the partnership assets. Under the terms 
of the partnership agreement the surviving partner had the right to buy out 
the interest of the deceased partner at its "then book value." The administrator 
contended that good will was a valuable partnership asset, even though not 
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carried on the books, and should be taken into account in determining the price 
of the deceased's interest. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, held, 
affirmed. By setting the price of the deceased's interest at book value the 
partners had expressly excluded good will from the partnership assets. Succes· 
swn of ]urisich, 224 La. 325, 69 S. (2d) 361 (1953). 
Only in relatively recent years have intangible benefits, classified under the 
title of good will, been recognized as a valuable property of the going business 
concem.1 In accordance with this development, the courts generally concede 
that in the dissolution of a partnership by reason of death of one of the members 
the surviving partner is held accountable to the representatives of the deceased 
for the good will, the same as for any other partnership asset.2 Whether 
the business is sold to a third party or retained by the surviving member, the 
result is the same.3 Nor does it seem that good will has to be on the books4 
or even mentioned in the agreement.5 Unless expressly excluded, it will be 
included as a partnership asset. This principle was applied by this same court 
in a 1949 decision,6 and the defendant urged that they follow it again. How-
ever, the partners may contract to exclude good will from the £inn assets if they 
wish.7 This forms an exception to the general rule holding the surviving 
member accountable, and is the distinguishing feature of the principal case. 
In providing that the deceased's interest should be valued according to ''book 
value," did the parties intend to exclude good will and thereby come within 
the exception? With more general terms such as partnership "property," 
"effects," or "assets" the court might easily have found that good will was 
1 Early text writers on partnership did not feel that good will was even important 
enough to deserve mention, or, if good will was mentioned these writers B.atly denied its 
value as a partnership asset. WATSON, PARTNEnsmP (1794); 3 KENT, CoMMENTARIBs, 
12th ed., 74 (1873). 
2 44 A.L.R. 517 (1926). This annotation offers extensive citations from thirteen states, 
England, and Canada in support of this rule. For more recent decisions on this general 
problem see I A.L.R. Supp. Dec. 436 (1946); 2 A.L.R. Supp. Dec. 109 (1952); A.L.R. 
Supp. Dec. (1954 Supp.) 59. 
3 This was not always true. In early cases the surviving partner could retain the use 
of the good will without accounting to the representatives of the deceased. Hammond v. 
Douglas, 5 Ves. Jr. 539, 31 Eng. Rep. 726 (1800); Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421, 58 
Eng. Rep. 899 (1835). 
4 One author, who is both a lawyer and an accountant, suggests that, unless otherwise 
provided for in the articles, good will must be on the books and valued accordingly in 
order to be included as an asset on dissolution. MooRE, LAw AND AccoUNTING 142 
(1952). But were this true, then good will would always be valued at book value, which 
is not borne out by the cases. See In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926); Rutan 
v. Coolidge, 241 Mass. 584, 136 N.E. 257 (1922); Tennant v. Dunlop, 97 Va. 234, 33 
S.E. 620 (1899). 
5 Wilmer v. Thomas, 74 Md. 485, 22 A. 403 (1891); Lothrop Publishing Co. v. 
Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co., 191 Mass. 353, 77 N.E. 841 (1906). 
6Succession of Conway, 215 La. 819, 41 S. (2d) 729 (1949). 
7 44 A.L.R. 517 (1926). The discussion on this point in the annotation is rather 
brief, yet it offers several leading cases where agreements to this effect, both express and 
implied, have been enforced. For later decisions in this area, see A.L.R. supplements cited 
in note 2 supra. 
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included, 8 but not so with a concept so clearly defined as book value. By 
definition, book value encompasses only those assets which are on the books of 
the partnership.9 Under standard accounting practice good will would be 
listed on the books only when it represents actual cost incurred,10 and there-
fore only to that extent would it be included in book value. Furthermore, both 
partners had complete access to the partnership books and knew, or should 
have known, that good will was not carried thereon. Thus the court was on 
solid ground in finding that the parties did not intend to include good will as 
a partnership asset in setting their price on book value. If this holding did not 
fulfill the real intention of the parties, then the words were poorly chosen and 
the partners have no one to blame but their own counsel. The significance of 
this decision lies in pointing up once again that words for the lawyer are tools 
of art and must be used to express only what his client actually intends. 
Richard M. Adams 
s Succession of Conway, note 6 supra. 
9 Lane v. Barnard, 185 App. Div. 754, 173 N.Y.S. 714 (1919); Fleming v. Fleming, 
211 Iowa 1251, 230 N.W. 359 (1930); Hagan v. Dundore, 187 Md. 430, 50 A. (2d) 
570 (1946). 
10P.ATON, EssBNTIALS OF AccOUNTING 585 (1949); LB.AKE, COMMERCIAL GoonWILL 
44 (1948). 
